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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of independent directors in 
Vietnam about their roles and challenges when sitting on the boards of listed companies. 
Design/methodology/approach: The study uses mailed questionnaires to collect data. We sent 
surveys to 810 independent directors from 354 listed companies and received feedback from 
170 respondents. 
Findings: We examine several aspects of independent directors’ work on the board. Findings 
suggest that independent directors in Vietnam place more emphasis on their advisory role than 
their monitoring role. In addition, directors also point out their challenges including 
information asymmetries and the influence of controlling shareholders. These challenges are 
significant, and they prevent independent directors from properly executing their independent 
role on the board. These findings reflect some of the unique features of corporate governance 
in transition economies. 
Originality/ Value: We contribute to the literature through providing an insightful view about 
the nature of the work performed by this type of director in a transition economy. The study is 
also one of the first studies to use a qualitative instrument to provide an explanation of how 
controlling shareholders influence independent directors on boards of directors. 
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1. Introduction  
Independent directors have long been considered as an important internal corporate governance 
mechanism, yet there is no universal definition of independent directors. The notion of 
“independent directors” is originally from the US after a giant corporate collapse – that of the 
Penn Central Transportation Company, in which the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) criticized the Penn Central board for lacking independence, failing to oversee 
operations, and not being able to identify the company’s problems (Gordon, 2007). Since then, 
independent directors have become more popular in corporate governance and have been 
central to regulatory reform after several corporate scandals. In the early 1990s, reform in the 
UK, based on the Cadbury Report released in 1992, has focused on the importance of the 
independent director. The Report recommends an enhanced function for independent directors 
as well as an increase in the number of independent directors on boards (Brooks et al., 2009). 
Another example of reform relating to independent directors is the changes to the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations in Australia in 2010 in response to 
the collapse of the HIH (Le Mire and Gilligan, 2013). These changes in corporate governance 
are expected to provide effective risk management devices that put more pressure on 
management to mitigate agency conflicts and unethical managerial behavior while maintaining 
a company’s capacity for innovation. Thus, independent directors are considered to be 
fundamental to good corporate governance (Brooks et al., 2009).  
However, the prior literature fails to establish a robust relationship between independent 
directors and improvement in firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). Some authors claim that by lacking operational expertise and a basic 
understanding of the nature of the company’s business, independent directors’ contribution to 
the board and the firms’ activities is limited since they may not know what is really going on 
in the company (Roberts et al., 2005, Ringe, 2013). Another possible reason is that independent 
directors do not fully recognize their duties/roles on the board because guidelines in the various 
codes are rather general, particularly in countries where corporate governance is weak 
(Kakabadse et al., 2010). Therefore, an investigation into the perceptions of independent 
directors on a range of issues including the nature of the work performed and the challenges 
faced by them in current corporate governance systems is needed to understand the role of 
independent directors on boards as well as the monitoring mechanism over management used 
by them to mitigate agency conflicts in corporate governance. 
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Given the nature of research to explore the perceptions of independent directors, a study using 
qualitative methods is required to further our understanding of the role of board members in 
corporate governance. Prior literature shows that the majority of studies relating to corporate 
governance, particularly boards of directors, use empirical methods to investigate the role of 
the board and the relationship between board structure and firm outcomes, yet this method is 
identified as having various limitations when it comes to examining the role of the board of 
directors (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Examples are the endogeneity issue in corporate 
governance, heterogeneity in the governance solutions each firm opts for and the over-
simplified models used which abstract away from many features of real, complex companies 
and their corporate governance (Adams et al., 2010). 
In the literature, only a few studies have used qualitative instruments to examine the 
perceptions of independent directors about their roles and challenges when participating on the 
board; examples are Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) in the Netherlands and Brooks et 
al., (2009) in Australia. These studies have focused mainly on developed countries while there 
is a lack of similar studies in other groups of countries such as developing countries or transition 
economies. In transition economies, independent directors play an important role where 
corporate governance systems are at an early stage of development (Peng et al., 2003; Clarke, 
2006). A study in China by Kakabadse et al. (2010) shows that independent directors in 
transition economies are not as effective as they should be due to key differences in transition 
economies as compared with developed countries. The dominance of the state as a major 
controlling shareholder, the highly concentrated ownership structure as well as the lack of 
supporting institutions for governance mechanisms are a few key differences between these 
two group of countries (Peng et al., 2003, Kakaladse et al., 2010).  
The notion of independent director originated in the US in the 1970s after the collapse of Penn 
Central, a major railway company. Then it spread to other countries including developed and 
developing countries and now transition economies (Ringe, 2013). However, according to 
Pistor et al., (2003), countries adopting foreign concepts frequently find various challenges to 
incorporate new concepts into their institutional settings. Therefore, an extension of the 
literature across transition economies will help us to understand the process of implementing 
“independent directors” in corporate governance, as well as to examine the role of and 
challenges for independent directors in transition economies.  
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One of the features of a transition economy is the movement from a centrally planned economy 
where the state has total control of companies to a free-market economy. This results in a highly 
concentrated ownership structure with the dominance of the state as the largest controlling 
shareholder which may complicate the work of independent directors. According to Ferrarini 
and Filippelli (2014), the role and impact of independent directors in corporations with 
controlling shareholders are less frequently analyzed. Independent directors have a different 
and relatively narrower role to perform in controlled corporations and often play an even 
weaker role than economic theory would predict.  
In this study, we aim to examine the perceptions of independent directors in listed companies 
in Vietnam via a mail survey to answer the research question: “How do independent directors 
recognize their roles and challenges in corporate governance, particularly under the 
presence of controlling shareholders in a transition economy?” 
One significant advantage of a survey is that it can help to obtain a depth of information from 
a wide population by collecting quantitative and specific data on the perceptions/beliefs of 
respondents (Brooks et al., 2009). Mail surveys are also powerful, effective and efficient in 
terms of costs and administration and can be distributed to many targeted participants. A 
specific segment of the population (such as a sample of independent directors) can easily be 
reached via post mail (Scheuren, 2004). So a survey-based approach allows us to ask very 
specific and qualitative questions to obtain high-quality information while maintaining the 
relatively large sample (Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
Vietnam provides a unique context to answer the research question. Vietnam has a young 
corporate governance system that emerged after the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the early 1990s. Further, it has a high level of ownership concentration, in which the 
controlling shareholder can be either the state or private shareholders,1 weak legal investor 
protection levels and the dominance of state ownership (World Bank, 2012). The ownership 
concentration along with the dominance of the state in firm ownership structure and the low 
level of government efficiency is a unique feature of Vietnam as compared to other transition 
economies such as Russia and China. For example, Nguyen et al. (2017) find that most of listed 
companies have highly concentrated ownership. They also find that the highly concentrated 
ownership in listed companies in Vietnam negatively influences the relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance and the participation of the state as a controlling 
                                                            
1 In this study, we define private shareholders as individuals and institutions that are not related to the state. 
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shareholder undermines this relationship more than private controlling shareholders. Nguyen 
et al.’s (2017) findings provide a motivation for this study to conduct further investigation into 
how controlling shareholders, in particular how the state influences independent directors on 
boards. 
The recent introduction of independent directors in corporate governance in Vietnam is another 
factor that may lead to different findings in the context of Vietnam. In 2012, after some 
corporate collapses (such as the bankruptcies of Vien Dong Pharmacy, the Bach Tuyet 
Company, and the Hanic Company), the Vietnam Ministry of Finance released a new version 
of the Codes for Corporate Governance in Listed Companies in Vietnam.2 In this new code,3 
independent directors have been clearly defined and required by mandatory regulation it is 
required for all listed companies to strengthen the monitoring power of the board. However, 
there are still several issues when implementing the new codes. First, no specific guidance on 
the responsibilities and duties of independent directors is stated in the code. The code only 
states the general responsibilities and duties of all board members. Therefore, it is possible that 
companies have brought independent directors onto the board but independent directors 
themselves may not be able to understand what they should or should not do as independent 
directors, how they are different from other board members, and what could be challenging for 
them when participating on the board of a specific company. Second, although the codes 
require listed companies to have at least one-third of the board members as independent 
directors, in fact, only about half of the companies complied with this requirement in 2014 
(Nguyen et al., 2017). This demonstrates that independent directors on boards may not have 
sufficient “collective power” to influence boards’ decisions and to execute their monitoring 
power. Because of these uncertainties, this research will examine how independent directors in 
Vietnam recognize their roles and challenges when undertaking a new role on the board. The 
findings will enable government and policy makers to identify the issues in current practice 
and propose necessary changes to the legislation. Further, the findings may help the 
government to develop a suitable framework, guidelines, and legislation to enhance the role of 
independent directors as an important internal control mechanism in corporate governance. 
                                                            
2 The first version of the Corporate Governance Codes for Listed Companies in Vietnam is released in 2007. 
3 In Corporate Governance Codes 2012, except for independent directors who are introduced as a mandatory 
internal control mechanism for listed companies, other control measures such as board committees are optional. 
Additionally, if boards of directors decide to have a sub-committee, only human resources committee and 
remuneration committee are required to have at least one independent director to be the committee member. 
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The paper makes two contributions. The paper’s first contribution is its exploration of the 
perceptions of independent directors in Vietnam from three perspectives – their role, their 
accessibility to information and the challenges in their work as an independent board member 
under the presence of controlling shareholders. Most of the previous similar studies on 
independent directors focus on developed countries such as the US or Australia where 
corporate governance and its supporting institutions are well developed (Brooks et al., 2009), 
but little is known about independent directors in countries with weak corporate governance 
and a lack of supporting institutions. Moreover, differences in economic development and 
business environment can also result in different perceptions of independent directors as well 
as different challenges for independent directors (Aguilera et al., 2008). Second, it contributes 
to the literature on the relationship between independent directors and ownership concentration 
by pointing out how ownership concentration creates challenges for independent directors 
under conditions of weak corporate governance. Most of the previous studies focus on the 
quantitative measure of this relationship, but few have asked independent directors: “how does 
ownership concentration affect your role?” 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the roles of 
and challenges faced by independent directors when sitting on a board. Section 3 describes the 
data and research design, followed by the results and discussion in Section 4. Section 5 
summarizes the conclusions and provides research implications. 
2. Literature review 
The following section reviews the literature to examine the roles of independent directors in 
theoretical and empirical studies as well as the challenges faced by independent directors that 
are examined by corporate governance research.  
2.1 Roles of independent directors in corporate governance 
On the board of directors, there are three types of directors that are commonly dealt with in the 
literature: inside directors (who are currently working in the company), grey directors (who are 
non-executive directors but have relationships with the company, management or 
blockholders) and independent directors (who are non-executive directors and have no such 
affiliations) (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Among board members, independent directors appear 
to play a prevalent role in improving the monitoring power of the board over management and 
to protect the shareholders’ interests because of their independence from insiders, management, 
and the firm’s business activities. As a result, companies with more independent directors are 
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more likely to be in a better position to protect shareholders’ interests (Bhagat and Black, 
1999). In addition, Roberts et al. (2005) argue that independent directors can provide support 
for executives with their expertise, skills, and experience, apart from their monitoring function. 
As an outsider, an independent director can challenge the executives, ask questions, engage in 
discussion and debate on the company’s activities so that they contribute to enhancing 
management performance and, by that means, improving firm performance. 
However, the roles and duties of independent directors in the literature are still somewhat 
unclear. Do independent directors have the same duties and tasks as other board members or 
do they have some extra duties on the board? Are they effective in their monitoring activities? 
The literature on the role of independent directors in corporate governance has been developed 
under two streams, quantitative studies and qualitative studies. The former stream focuses on 
examining how differences in board structure affect the company’s outcomes and performance. 
In contrast, the latter stream uses qualitative methods like surveys or interviews to explore the 
question: “What do independent directors do”? It is worth noting that qualitative studies on the 
role of independent directors are rather limited while the more extensive quantitative studies 
use archival and secondary data (Adams et al., 2010). 
With regard to the quantitative empirical literature, the purpose of this type of research is to 
examine if particular functions/roles of independent directors contribute to improving 
corporate outcomes and performance. A large body of literature focuses on the monitoring role 
of independent directors over management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1999; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008, Faleye et al., 2011) and over firms’ activities (Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 1997). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Faleye et al. (2011) both find that when the board is 
independent, CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance. However, Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) argue that independent directors can be good at evaluating CEO performance, 
but if independent directors’ lack detailed knowledge about the firm’s business, they may not 
be effective in contributing to the process of hiring new CEOs for the company. In relation to 
the monitoring of independent directors over firms’ activities, Cotter et al. (1997), when 
considering the monitoring role of independent directors in tender offers in the US, find that if 
the target firm’s board is independent, the target shareholder gains over the tender offer period 
are higher than in target firms without majority-independent boards. Similarly, Brickley et al. 
(1994) report that US firms with majority-independent boards experience a more significantly 
positive stock market reaction to the adoption of a poison pills defence in a takeover, as 
compared with firms without such boards.  
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Concerning the monitoring function of independent directors, an increasing literature has 
focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the role of independent directors and the 
board of directors in satisfying the interests of all stakeholders in the company (Ayuso and 
Argandona, 2009). Under stakeholder theory, corporate governance is a system that forces 
management to internalize the welfare of not only shareholders but also stakeholders (Tirole, 
2010), in other words, affirming the company purpose of “maximizing the sum of various 
stakeholders’ surpluses” (Tirole, 2010, p.58). In that meaning, the responsibilities of 
independent directors toward CSR policies and activities are considered as a contribution to 
the interests of stakeholders (Freeman and Velamuri, 2006). Therefore, the monitoring by 
independent directors of CSR becomes more important as a part of their monitoring function.  
Recent literature on corporate governance has emphasized the other role of independent 
directors besides the monitoring role - that is the advisory role. The advisory role is “a more 
traditional job of forming strategy [that] requires close collaboration” (The Economist, 
February 2001; p.68). Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggest that both monitoring and advisory 
roles contribute mainly to improve firm performance but in an advisory role, board members 
need to take a more hands-off approach in which they must use their expertise and experience 
to counsel management on firms’ strategic decisions. In addition, according to Faleye et al. 
(2013), to be effective in an advisory role, directors need to build a trust relationship with the 
CEO to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas between them. Directors who 
undertake advisory roles should undertake minimal monitoring activities over management to 
be able to win the trust of the CEO so that they can get access to relevant strategic information 
(Adams, 2009). 
However, the above literature mostly uses empirical methods to examine the effectiveness of 
individual monitoring activities by means of archival data. In that respect, it lacks a 
comprehensive view of monitoring activities.  
Few studies, such as Hoghiemstra and Van Manen (2003) and Brooks et al. (2009), use 
qualitative methods to examine how independent directors understand their roles on the board. 
Both studies find that independent directors have emphasized their monitoring role while they 
are still aware of their advisory role. However, this research is in developed countries 
(Netherland and Australia) where corporate governance systems are highly developed. In the 
case of transition economies where corporate governance systems are still young and under-
developed, it is unclear how independent directors recognize their roles on the board. A similar 
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qualitative study focusing on a transition economy will provide a comprehensive analysis to 
further our understanding of independent directors in corporate governance across different 
countries. 
2.2 Challenges faced by independent directors 
To be qualified as independent, a director needs to satisfy all legal requirements as stated in 
the corporate governance codes. However, to be effective in his/her work, that director needs 
to overcome various challenges in corporate governance as well as the business environment. 
Two common challenges are the information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders and 
the prevalence of controlling shareholders on the board. 
2.2.1 Information asymmetries 
Information asymmetries between the executive and non-executive directors are a significant 
issue for independent directors. Information is essential for independent directors to 
communicate with insiders and to make appropriate decisions in exercising their duties. 
Theoretically, in a company where information accessibility is open and information disclosure 
is at a high level, the effectiveness of independent directors will be higher (Aguilera et al., 
2008). Independent directors are considered as part-time officers in the company and they only 
attend board meetings. Thus, it is difficult for them to get access to company information if 
information asymmetries between executive directors and independent directors exist 
(Maassen, 1999). In that situation, independent directors possibly need to rely on publicly 
available information if they deem that insufficient information is provided to them.  
Empirically, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) find a positive relationship between information 
disclosure and independent directors, which implies that when the board has more independent 
directors (i.e. more monitoring power), more information is made available to them and more 
information disclosure also contributes to the greater effectiveness of independent directors. 
The surveys by Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) point out the concerns from independent 
directors about their ability to fulfill the role of independent director due to the “independence 
paradox” (p.314), in which independent directors have to rely on the information provided by 
management and executive directors while they are expected by regulators and investors to be 
independent of managers. Stiles and Taylor (2001) also find that because of limited access to 
information and limited time to devote to being a board member, the board basically acts in a 
“gatekeeper role” (p.43). Similarly, in Brooks et al.’s (2009) study, independent directors 
propose that they need more information to support their responsibilities and duties on the 
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board. In particular, they require more “future-oriented” information and fewer historical 
financial reports, which, by definition, focus on details about past events. It can be seen that 
information accessibility is crucial for independent directors to execute their roles as a board 
member, yet the existence of information asymmetries can create challenges to these directors.  
2.2.2 Ownership concentration 
In companies with controlling shareholders, the prevalent agency conflict that independent 
directors need to deal with is not the conflict between owners and managers but the conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). The 
dominance of controlling shareholders can be a serious challenge to independent directors 
because the former can use their prevalent voting power to influence management as well as 
other board members to make decisions contrary to the independent directors (Dahya et al., 
2008). The other possibility is that controlling shareholders can collude with independent 
directors to exploit the benefit of minority shareholders (Jiang and Peng, 2011). In that case, 
independent directors are not capable of taking up their roles, responsibilities, and tasks, and 
can become ineffective on the board. 
Empirical evidence on the effect of controlling shareholders on independent directors is 
inconclusive. Some studies find a negative influence of controlling shareholders on 
independent directors (Claessen and Fan, 2002; Dahya et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2011) while other 
studies find a positive influence or no impact on controlling shareholders (Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007; Liu et al., 2015). Research in transition economies on the impact of controlling 
shareholders on independent directors is also mixed. In China, Liu et al. (2015) find a positive 
influence of controlling shareholders on the relationship between independent directors and 
firm performance while Nguyen et al. (2017) report an opposite impact of controlling 
shareholders on independent directors in Vietnam. The next question that will be of interest to 
academia and practitioners is how controlling shareholders influence independent directors on 
boards.  
Little is known about mechanisms that controlling shareholders use to influence independent 
directors. Is it the effect of the collusion between the two or is it because controlling 
shareholders use their power on the board to disable the independent directors? Few studies 
look at this issue. Kakabadse et al. (2010) interview 21 independent directors from listed 
companies in China, and find that independent directors tend to depend on the person or group 
who appoints them and in many cases this is the controlling shareholder. By having this on 
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their minds, independent directors become ineffective in monitoring and exercising control 
over management and also controlling shareholders because they fear being replaced if they 
challenge either managers or other board members. In addition, controlling shareholders also 
play a role in recruitment that may lead to the selection of independent directors becoming 
ineffective. Nevertheless, Kakabadse et al. (2010) also acknowledge that their findings have 
limitations because of the small sample size used in their study. 
A similar study in another transition economy and another context of course, may come up 
with another finding about the influence of controlling shareholders on the roles that 
independent directors exercise. As transition economies become more diverse after their 
transition process (Grosman et al., 2016), corporate governance systems and their associated 
mechanisms including independent directors may work differently due to differences in 
political, legal and economic systems as well as the difference in the level of economic 
development. Apart from these macro-differences, state ownership and government efficiency 
may differ and may lead to differences in the influence of the state as a controlling shareholder 
on corporate governance and, in particular, on independent directors. Therefore, this study of 
the perceptions of independent directors about their roles and challenges under the presence of 
a controlling shareholder in Vietnam will extend our understanding of the development of 
corporate governance and how independent directors can contribute to improving governance 
in a country with a very young corporate governance system. In summary, the study aims to 
provide an answer to the research question “How do independent directors recognize their 
roles and challenges in corporate governance in the presence of controlling shareholders in 
a transition economy?”  
3. Research design 
This study uses a qualitative research method to collect information on the perceptions of 
independent directors about their roles and challenges on their boards. The data is obtained 
directly from the participants via a research survey instrument. As our objective is to gather as 
many opinions of independent directors as possible, we choose a mail survey as the most 
appropriate data collection method.  
However, there are issues with using mail surveys such as procuring an accurate list of people 
in the population from which to draw the sample. In our study, since there is no database for 
collecting information about independent directors in Vietnam, we need to manually collect 
personal information (names and addresses) of independent directors of listed companies in 
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Vietnam from published annual reports. It is a mandatory requirement for listed companies to 
specifically identify their independent directors in their published reports. Thus, we rely on this 
information to build up the mailing list. The list contains 810 independent directors from 354 
listed companies, indicating an average of 2.35 independent directors per company. In the 
population, there are 634 listed companies in 2015, but we exclude financial companies and 
companies without detailed information of independent directors, and the sample ends up with 
354 listed companies. 
The surveys are initially designed for a larger study, and we extract part of the survey results 
for this research paper. The original survey has five parts (please refer to Appendix 1). Part 1 
collects demographic information on survey participants; part 2 to part 4 contain information 
for another study, while part 5 is designed purposely for this study. Part 5 consists of nine 
sections. At the beginning of each section, a brief instruction is provided to ensure the clarity 
of the tasks. The questions employed are essentially based on those used in Brookes et al.’s 
(2009) study and are developed further from a review of the literature. The surveys are 
structured with a combination of five-point Likert-scale type questions, and Yes/No response 
type questions to indicate participants’ opinions on provided statements about their roles and 
challenges in participating on a board of directors.  
To test the validity of the survey instrument, a draft is sent to several senior academic staff in 
the Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance at Macquarie University. A 
Vietnamese version of the survey instrument is sent to some academic staff at the Faculty of 
Banking and Finance in the Foreign Trade University to check the suitability of the questions 
to Vietnamese practice and culture. After the pilot test, and based on the feedback from these 
participants, minor changes are made to the final version of the survey that is sent to 
independent directors.  
In addition, to ensure the validity of the response, we add three extra questions as a 
manipulation check after each question in part 2 as suggested by Oppenheimer et al., (2009). 
Final versions of the survey instrument are sent to 810 independent directors4 in April 2016 
with a follow-up mail out after two months. We received 190 responses in total, and after the 
manipulation check, a total of 170 usable responses remained, representing a response rate of 
21%. According to Holbrook et al. (2007), this response rate is reasonable and acceptable given 
                                                            
4 We employ an agent in Vietnam to administer the surveys on behalf of the research team. We believe that using 
an agent may help to increase the response rate as they have experience in survey administration as well as a better 
understanding of Vietnamese market conditions. 
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the difficulties of obtaining responses from a mailed survey. Moreover, Visser et al. (1996) 
find that surveys with lower response rates (around 20%) yield more accurate and reliable 
measurements than surveys with higher response rate (50% or more). 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Personal profile of respondents 
The personal profile of respondents to the survey provides information about their age, 
expertise and experience as independent directors (Table 1). The majority of respondents are 
in their 30s (48%), 22% of respondents are in their 40s, while the proportions of respondents 
under 30 and over 50 are almost the same (15%). This shows that independent directors 
participating in the survey are relatively young. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
With regard to their experience as independent directors, since independent directors are 
introduced in the Corporate Governance Codes 2012, most of the respondents have less than 
five years’ experience in that capacity and may have been recruited to fulfill the requirements 
of the new code. In fact, 34% of participants tell that they have more than three years’ 
experience sitting on the board of a company where 66% of respondents report less than three 
years. In addition, the majority of respondents do not have multi-directorships with about 92% 
of respondents sitting on only one board and 8% saying that they sit on more than one. 
Concerning the expertise of independent directors, 41% of respondents specialize in accounting 
whereas 16% of them have law expertise. Moreover, 24% of respondents work in the non-
manufacturing area and 20% work in manufacturing industries. The majority of respondents 
have a bachelor’s degree (69%) while 27% hold a master’s degree and 4% even hold a Ph.D.  
The youth of the participants in the survey reflects the fact that independent directors are a new 
and recent addition to corporate governance mechanisms in Vietnam and most of the 
independent directors lack experience in undertaking this new role. 
4.2 Roles of independent directors 
As suggested by the literature, independent directors have two major functions on the board – 
the monitoring function and the advisory function. Each function requires independent 
directors to take different responsibilities and to make different contributions. To understand 
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the role of independent directors on the boards of Vietnamese listed companies, we ask 
questions to explore the responsibilities, contributions, and interaction among board members. 
4.2.1 Key responsibilities of independent directors 
In part 5 of the survey (Appendix 1), we ask questions to understand the perceptions of 
independent directors of their responsibilities. Key responsibilities of independent directors are 
outlined in studies by Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) and Brooks et al. (2009) and fall 
into two different groups: the monitoring responsibilities and advisory responsibilities. Table 
1 reports the results of the recognition of independent directors’ responsibilities. It is noted that 
Vietnam corporate governance codes contain no guidelines about the responsibilities of 
independent directors so the responses in the survey may be the result of self-recognition of 
directors from their own practice.  
As shown in Table 2, it appears that independent directors place emphasis on advisory roles 
with the highest level of agreement being (1) Contribute to the development of corporate 
strategy (4.471), (2) Identify issues that require more management attention for future 
improvement (4.335) and (3) Ensure strategic corporate decisions are reached through sound 
processes (4.329). In the literature, Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, (2004) and Van den Berghe 
and Levrau (2004) suggest the “strategic advisor” role of independent directors. In this study, 
the results provide further evidence about the significance of this role of independent directors 
in a transition economy. However, the prior literature also notes that to be able to take up the 
role as “strategic advisor”, independent directors need “the freedom and confidence to think 
independently and widely beyond the functional limits of managerial disciplines” (Garratt, 
2005, p.31) along with the ability to obtain access to reliable information and to build up a trust 
relationship with executive members of management (Faleye et al., 2013). Thus, independent 
directors should be aware of these challenges when undertaking an advising role on a board. It 
is also surprising that in Vietnam the monitoring function of independent directors has been 
rated lower than the advisory function.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Responsibilities associated with the monitoring role are rated lower. In particular, several 
monitoring responsibilities have quite low scores; such as (1) Scrutinize management 
performance (4.324), (2) Provide an independent check on corporate control (4.065) and (3) 
Ensure robust risk management is in place (4.059). Interestingly, independent directors 
consider the monitoring of senior executive remuneration (3.647) far less important as 
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compared to other responsibilities. In addition, we ask about the monitoring of independent 
directors over a company’s CSR, which is associated with the interests of other stakeholders. 
We find that independent directors seem to disagree that monitoring CSR is one of their key 
responsibilities (two responsibilities relating to CSR are ranked lowest as shown in Table 2). 
The results of the survey demonstrate that independent directors rate their monitoring 
responsibility toward shareholders higher than towards other stakeholders although they seem 
to be less agreed about the importance of monitoring responsibilities. 
This preference of independent directors for an advisory role is not consistent with the prior 
literature on independent directors which considers that the primary responsibility of directors 
is to monitor management (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Faleye et al., 2011). However, it may 
reflect the unique circumstances of many transition economies (Cheung et al., 2008; Kakabadse 
et al., 2010). The reason may be that in transition economies where there are numerous 
obstacles for independent directors to execute their monitoring roles (such as concentrated 
ownership structure, the dominance of the state, weak legal investor protections and lack of 
experience and capability, etc.), the monitoring function of independent directors is 
undermined (Cheung et al., 2008). In that situation, independent directors may prefer to 
undertake an advisory role to avoid possible conflicts arising between them and management 
and controlling shareholders. Referring to the Vietnam situation, ownership concentration is 
common in listed companies with the dominance of the state while corporate governance 
institutions are weak or non-existent (Vo and Nguyen, 2014, Nguyen et al., 2017). Although 
the new corporate governance codes require listed companies to have more than 30% of board 
members as independent directors, in practice, many companies fail to do so (Nguyen et al., 
2017). As a result, independent directors may not have sufficient power and they may prefer to 
put less emphasis on the monitoring role in order to avoid conflict with other board members 
and management.  
We further analyze the data to examine if the perception of independent directors with regard 
to responsibilities relating to monitoring and advisory functions differs across independent 
directors with different expertise and different degrees of experience on the board. According 
to Guner et al. (2008) and Wang et al. (2015), independent directors with different expertise 
may have a different level of effectiveness in the monitoring function. In effect, independent 
directors with industry expertise are more likely to have a better ability to oversee management 
(Wang et al., 2015) whereas independent directors with accounting and financial expertise may 
focus more on finance and investment decisions (which is related to the advisory function) but 
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not monitoring (for example: over executive compensation) (Guner et al., 2008). In this study, 
we ask independent directors with different expertise about their perceptions of different 
responsibilities relating to monitoring and advisory functions. The results are presented in 
Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Interestingly, the results show that independent directors with law expertise have the highest 
level of agreement about their responsibilities relating to both monitoring and advisory 
functions. On the other hand, independent directors with manufacturing expertise have the 
lowest level of agreement on the responsibilities relating to both advisory and monitoring. This 
finding contradicts the findings in the study by Wang et al. (2015). Meanwhile, independent 
directors with accounting backgrounds rate responsibilities relating to their advisory role 
relatively higher than responsibilities relating to their monitoring function, which is consistent 
with findings in Guner et al.’s (2008) study. Due to the limited amount of data collected, the 
analysis on the difference in perceptions of independent directors toward responsibilities 
relating to monitoring and advisory functions based on the difference in expertise is mainly 
descriptive. Nevertheless, it still provides evidence on how perceptions of independent 
directors differ across expertise in Vietnam and suggests important implications. 
A possible explanation for the above difference in perceptions of independent directors with 
different expertise is that in Vietnam there are no legal guidelines for independent directors. 
Further, no training is provided to independent directors when they participate on the board. 
As a result, independent directors with law backgrounds may have the skills to achieve a basic 
understanding of the roles of independent directors in corporate governance legislation. On the 
other hand, independent directors with manufacturing or non-manufacturing backgrounds may 
not have access to such sources of information. Thus, they might not know what they should 
do on the board. This result highlights the need for either guidelines in corporate governance 
codes for independent directors about their roles or a training course for individuals who have 
been newly appointed to be independent directors. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The second factor that may affect the perceptions of independent directors about their role is 
their experience on the board. In our sample, 66% of independent directors have less than three 
years of experience sitting on a corporate board while 34% of them have more than three years. 
Generally, the result demonstrates that independent directors with more experience on the 
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board have a significantly higher level of agreement on responsibilities relating monitoring 
function (as shown in Table 4) while the level of agreement on advisory function is more likely 
to be the same between two groups of independent directors. This means that more experienced 
directors establish a better understanding of what they should do on a board in monitoring 
activities. This result is consistent with prior studies, which suggest that independent directors 
with more experience exhibit better monitoring and advisory capacities (Ferris et al., 2003; 
Kroll et al., 2008). This may suggest that in the near future when independent directors can 
accumulate their experience on the board, they may become more aware of what they should 
do on the board. 
4.2.2 Involvement of independent directors in board activities 
To consider the contribution of independent directors to the company, we attempt to explore 
the areas over which independent directors perceive they have power and their level of 
contribution in different activities. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
As shown in Table 5, 82% of independent directors believe they have the power to influence 
company strategy which is consistent with the recognition of the most significant responsibility 
as a strategic advisor, as discussed in the previous section. Independent directors recognize that 
they have the key responsibility of contributing to corporate strategy, and they believe they 
have power over this area. 
Further, Table 5 demonstrates that only 25% of independent directors indicate that they have 
the power to change professional advisors for the company and 30% believe that they can 
control executives’ compensation. The low capacity of power to monitor executive 
compensation along with the unwillingness of independent directors to consider the 
responsibility to set up executive compensation as a key responsibility, as shown in Table 2, 
reveal that independent directors in Vietnam tend to avoid monitoring executive compensation. 
One possible reason is that in transition economies where there is ownership concentration with 
the dominance of the state, companies tend to have powerful CEOs who have strong ties to 
controlling shareholders (Lin, 2001). Thus, independent directors may aim to avoid creating 
conflicts with executives in monitoring remuneration. In our sample, respondents reveal that 
56.47% of their CEOs are representatives of controlling shareholders (See Table 7). When 
comparing the responses of participants whose company has a representative of controlling 
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shareholders as the CEO and the responses of participants whose company has a CEO without 
any relationship to controlling shareholders, the results show that independent directors in the 
former group rated the responsibility to set executive compensation relatively lower than the 
latter group (3.56 against 3.71).5 The other possible reason is that, in firms with ownership 
concentration, controlling shareholders have a strong influence on setting executive pay (Kato 
and Long, 2006) and, hence, less powerful independent directors might be reluctant to execute 
their monitoring capabilities over executive compensation.   
Concerning the involvement of independent directors in different activities, as shown in Table 
6, the highest-rated contribution is to protect shareholders’/investors’ interests (4.111), which 
is theoretically the main duty of the board of directors. We also ask if independent directors 
contribute to protecting the interests of controlling shareholders. However, most respondents 
agree that protecting the interest of controlling shareholders is an activity to which they make 
a relatively minor contribution (3.018). Hence, it can be concluded that independent directors 
aim to place emphasis on protecting the interests of general/minority shareholders to mitigate 
the conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders and between management 
and shareholders. Further, in this study, it is implied that independent directors protect the 
interests of shareholders via their advisory role. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Respondents also place in the highest category their contribution to developing company 
strategies (4.041) and to providing new ideas/insights (3.982). This, again, confirms the 
preference of independent directors for undertaking an advisory role on a board while it seems 
that they are less willing to take a monitoring role. The rating of their contribution to improving 
management’s monitoring function was among the lowest score at 3.553.  
4.3 Challenges for independent directors on the board 
4.3.1 The impact of controlling shareholders 
In our sample, 162 responses out of 170 responses are from firms with concentrated ownership 
structures, of which 56.79% have the state as the controlling shareholder against 43.21% with 
private controlling shareholders. The dominance of responses from firms with concentrated 
ownership in this study confirms one significant feature of corporate governance in transition 
economies: a highly concentrated ownership structure.  
                                                            
5 We do not report this data on the paper but we are willing to provide the results of this analysis if requested. 
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The influence of controlling shareholders on the board can be felt through numerous 
mechanisms such as appointing individuals who have a close relationship with them to be the 
chair of the board, appointing CEOs and nominating independent directors (Yeh and Woidtke, 
2005; Kakabadse et al., 2010). Respondents reveal that 75.88% of companies have as chair a 
person with a close relationship with controlling shareholders (e.g. family members or 
representatives); 56.47% of companies have someone with a close relationship with controlling 
shareholders as CEO. This demonstrates that controlling shareholders have a tendency to 
influence board composition (appointing the chair) more than CEO appointment. Nevertheless, 
the high percent of companies having a representative of a controlling shareholder as CEO also 
indicates the high level of influence controlling shareholders exercise over a firm’s daily 
activities. In addition, the other mechanism that a controlling shareholder may use to exert an 
impact on the board is to nominate and appoint their representatives as the majority of board 
members. In the survey, 85.88% of respondents indicate that a controlling shareholder 
controlled the board by having some representatives on the board. This leads to the possibility 
that independent directors are reluctant to execute their monitoring function since they know 
they could not call for votes against the controlling shareholders or against the management if 
management is backed by controlling shareholders. In addition, in a business environment 
under a collectivist setting such as in Vietnam, individual relationships are such important 
elements that people tend to avoid conflicts with their business partners (Vuong et al., 2013). 
This finding may explain why independent directors prefer to execute their advisory function 
over their monitoring function on their boards.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Concerning the impact of a controlling shareholder on independent directors, we ask if 
independent directors are nominated by controlling shareholders or minority shareholders. As 
shown in Table 7, 60.59% of independent directors reveal that they are nominated by 
controlling shareholders to participate in the board, and 18.82% of respondents are nominated 
by minority shareholders with a close relationship with controlling shareholders (for example 
banks or other financial institutions). However, 20.59% of independent directors are nominated 
by minority shareholders without any relationship with a controlling shareholder. In summary, 
about 79% of independent directors participate on the board under the influence of controlling 
shareholders. As Kakabadse et al. (2010) suggest, once an independent director is nominated 
and voted for by the controlling shareholder, it is less likely that he/she will vote against the 
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controlling shareholder because that independent director needs the former’s voting power to 
stay on the board.  
4.3.2 Information asymmetries  
Information is essential for independent directors to undertake their roles regardless of whether 
they are monitoring or advising. Independent directors are outsiders, and they have limited 
access to information. Only when the CEO or insiders are willing to share information with 
them, they can undertake their roles effectively (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Hooghiemstra and 
Van Manen (2004) propose the “independence paradox” in which independent directors need 
to monitor management independently, but have to rely on the information provided by them. 
In this survey, we also find a similar challenge for independent directors when they participate 
on the board. 
When being asked about the barriers that independent directors face when sitting on the board, 
the two issues rated the highest are (1) Lack of information for informed decision-making 
(4.241) and (2) Executive Directors holding back information (4.159). This highlights the 
problem associated with information accessibility of independent directors to serve the 
decision-making process. Su et al. (2008) suggest that if there is collusion between controlling 
shareholders and management, the flow of information to independent directors might be 
restricted to prevent them from effectively assessing management behavior. In addition, Nowak 
and McCabe (2003) also find that even without the existence of a controlling shareholder, the 
CEO and executive directors have controlling powers over information, thus creating 
information asymmetries with outsider directors. 
Concerning the amount of information received, as revealed in Table 8, none of the respondents 
believes that too much information is provided to them while 83% of them say that they 
received sufficient information and only 17% responded that they received too little. Regarding 
the validity of that information, surprisingly, about 23% of respondents tell that they could not 
check the validity of the information, which indicates a serious problem. While we assume that 
information is essential to independent directors to fulfill their monitoring and advisory roles, 
the invalidity of information may lead to inappropriate decisions being made, thus adversely 
affecting firm performance (Nowak and McCabe, 2003).  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
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With regard to sources of information as presented in Table 9, independent directors also 
recognize published financial reports and formal board meetings as the most important source 
of information. Although independent directors reveal that they receive sufficient information, 
they also claim that the information they receive contains too much emphasis on historically 
detailed financial information (78.24% of respondents) while they are looking to receive more 
forecast information (65.14%) and strategic information (52.54%) (See Table 9). This indicates 
that to make their own decisions they need to rely on either the information publicly provided 
to other shareholders and public users or the information intentionally provided by the CEO 
and executive directors. Having said that, the independence paradox also exists in Vietnam as 
executive directors are still the most important sources of information. This problem is 
considered a global issue and overcoming the independence paradox is still under consideration 
with regard to changing the regulatory environment (Brooks et al., 2009). 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
4.3.3 Other challenges for independent directors in Vietnam 
When being asked about the barriers for independent directors in Vietnam, as shown in Table 
10, 30% of respondents strongly agree that the lack of detailed guidelines on 
duties/responsibilities of independent directors in the Corporate Governance Codes for Listed 
Companies is one of the key barriers for them when participating in a board (rated 4.159). This 
means there is a lack of legal support to back up the independent directors, and they undertake 
their roles based on their self-recognition of the concept of “independent directors” borrowed 
from other countries. This issue is specific to Vietnam because, in many countries, the 
introduction of independent directors is commonly accompanied by detailed guidelines on 
responsibilities/duties. For example, the responsibilities of independent directors have been 
outlined in Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in 
Listed Companies released by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission in 2001. In the 
UK, the UK Corporate Governance Codes of 2012 clearly state the role of independent 
directors in Section A.4. This raises the possibility for the regulator to release supplementary 
guidelines on independent directors in a new version of corporate governance codes in 
Vietnam. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
The other issues highlighted in the survey are the lack of knowledge/understanding of the 
company (3.906) and lack of involvement in the company (3.876). From the perspective of 
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independent directors, this expresses concerns that independent directors may not have 
sufficient time, and thus make sufficient effort, to be fully engaged and involved in a 
company’s activities. This is in line with Roberts et al. (2005) who suggest that a good 
understanding of the nature of the company would increase the contribution and accountability 
of independent directors in a company. Personal issues (such as personal faults or lack of 
ability) are also counted as barriers for independent directors on the board, and this problem is 
rated relatively important as compared with other issues (3.812). The next challenges are a lack 
of support from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to help independent directors to 
understand their roles on the board (3.642), a lack of fresh ideas to contribute to the board 
(3.618) and a lack of commitment by independent directors in the companies (3.612). 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the perceptions of independent directors in Vietnam when participating 
on boards of directors in listed companies. The results of the survey reveal that independent 
directors in Vietnam have a preference for undertaking an advisory role compared to a 
monitoring role. In addition, the perceptions of independent directors on their roles are different 
according to their expertise and experience on the boards. In particular, independent directors 
with law expertise appear to have the highest level of agreement on monitoring and advisory 
responsibilities on the board. This result demonstrates a need for supplementary guidelines on 
the roles and responsibilities of independent directors in the Corporate Governance Codes and 
a training course for individuals prior to commencing duties as independent directors on boards 
of directors. The finding also suggests that more experienced independent directors are more 
aware of their functions on the board which is a positive sign for corporate governance reform 
in Vietnam. 
In addition, independent directors in Vietnam tend to choose to undertake an advisory role on 
the board. However, they are facing several difficulties. The first one is information 
asymmetries between insiders and outsiders – the independence paradox. This is not an 
unexpected problem as it has been found in many developed and developing countries (e.g., 
Nowak and McCabe, 2003; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 2004, Brooks et al., 2009). Our 
findings indicate that information is also an issue in transition economies. More attention from 
regulators is needed to create a more transparent environment for all parties to obtain access to 
relevant information. Additionally, in this survey, independent directors claim that CEOs 
intentionally hold back information and that they need to rely mostly on public information 
23 
 
and information from the formal board meeting. That prevents independent directors from 
having sufficient information to understand the nature of decisions to be made. To be more 
effective, independent directors look forward to receiving more future forecast and strategic 
information while receiving less published financial information. 
The second challenge is the concentrated ownership commonly found in developing and 
transition economies. The literature suggests that controlling shareholders can adversely 
influence the effectiveness of independent directors. Our study points out several mechanisms 
by which controlling shareholders can affect independent directors in Vietnam. First, most 
respondents agree that controlling shareholders can disable the power of independent directors 
on the board by exerting control over the CEO, the chair or the majority of board members. 
Second, most respondents believe that the existence of controlling shareholders and their power 
limit the monitoring capacity of independent directors as directors need the voting power of 
controlling shareholders to be board members and it is not usual for them to be entirely 
independent of those who appoint them. 
In conclusion, this study formulates some insights into the perceptions of independent directors 
about their roles and the challenges faced by them and suggests several implications for both 
regulators and practitioners in Vietnam. Appropriate steps should be taken to encourage the 
engagement of independent directors and to limit the challenges for them on boards. First, by 
accelerating the privatization process, state ownership concentration can be reduced while legal 
investor protection can be strengthened. In doing so, the ownership structure in firms with the 
state as a controlling shareholder will be dispersed, leaving independent directors with more 
power on the board through receiving more voting power from minority shareholders. 
Additionally, minority shareholders will be protected legally, thus they will have more power 
to support independent directors on boards. Second, the result also highlights the need for 
guidelines in corporate governance codes and for training for independent directors so that they 
can understand what they should do when sitting on a corporate board. Finally, information 
disclosure and transparency is an issue for independent directors that prevents them from being 
effective in their decision-making. Regulators and the Security Exchange Commission in 
Vietnam should take specific actions in relation to policies that enhance information disclosure 
and transparency, such as requiring more mandatory information disclosure and increasing the 
penalty for information fraud. 
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The study has some limitations. Due to the small number of responses, the results cannot be 
generalized to all independent directors. This limitation is unavoidable with survey data 
collection. However, since the respondents in the survey come from various regions throughout 
Vietnam and from different industries, the result can be taken as a recommendation for Vietnam 
authorities, policy makers, and practitioners. Second, this study only considers the difference 
in perceptions of independent directors across different expertise and experience. Other factors 
may also affect the perceptions of independent directors such as age, education or gender. 
Additionally, the analysis does not control for firm characteristics, such as firm size, 
profitability, leverage, firm age. Finally, to provide a more comprehensive understanding, 
further studies can examine how these factors may affect independent directors’ behavior.  
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LIST OF TABLEs 
Paper title: “Perceptions of independent directors on their roles of and challenges on 
corporate boards – Evidence from a survey in Vietnam” 
 
Table 1 - Survey respondents’ profiles 
Age < 30s: 15% 30-40: 48% 40-50: 22% >50s: 15% 
Experience Less than 3 years 66% More than 3 years 34% 
Expertise Accounting 
41% 
Manufacturing 
20% 
Non-manufacturing 
24% 
Law 
16% 
Education  Bachelor degree 
69% 
Master degree 
27% 
PhD 
4% 
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Multi-directorship Participate in 1 
board 
92% Participate in more 
than 1 boards 
8% 
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Table 2 – Key responsibilities of independent directors 
      (Anchor point: 1 – Strongly disagree to 5 – Strongly agree)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Classification Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Contribute to the development of company strategy Advisory 4.471 5 0.808 
Identify issues that require more of management’s 
attention 
Advisory 4.335 5 0.863 
Ensure strategic corporate decisions are reached 
through sound processes 
Advisory 4.329 4 0.820 
Scrutinize management performance Monitor 4.324 4 0.854 
Comment on the attainment of the performance 
objectives for the company 
Advisory 4.288 4 0.803 
Play an active part in determining performance 
objectives/measures of the board 
Advisory 4.276 4 0.814 
Contribute to the development of internal performance 
measures 
Monitor 4.253 4 0.850 
Play an active part in determining performance 
objectives/measures for the company 
Advisory 4.235 4 0.740 
Satisfy themselves that financial information is 
accurate 
Monitor 4.153 4 1.044 
Be accessible to company managers to advise of 
untoward matters 
Advisory 4.100 4 0.854 
Provide an independent “check” on corporate control Monitor 4.065 4 0.974 
Ensure robust risk management is in place Monitor 4.059 4 1.118 
Play an active part in determining social responsibility 
performance objectives/ measures of the company 
Monitor 
(Stakeholders) 
4.024 
 
4 0.863 
Play a key role in the setting of senior executive 
compensation 
Monitor 3.647 4 1.051 
Play an active part in ensuring the company meets its 
social responsibility objectives/ measures 
Monitor 
(Stakeholders) 
3.353 
 
3 1.023 
Be a spokesperson to support specific corporate 
policies before the public and government 
Monitor 
(Stakeholders) 
2.782 3 1.138 
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Table 3 – Key responsibilities of independent directors with different expertise 
        (Anchor point: 1 – Strongly disagree to 5 – Strongly agree)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Accounting Law Non-
Manufacturing 
Manufacturing 
Contribute to the development of company 
strategy 
4.087 4.296 4.05 3.823 
Identify issues that require more of 
management’s attention 
4.159 4.296 4.189 3.970 
Ensure strategic corporate decisions are 
reached through sound processes 
4.378 4.481 4.125 4.323 
Scrutinize management performance 4.463 4.556 4.075 4.174 
 Comment on the attainment of the 
performance objectives for the company 
4.565 4.444 4.375 4.411 
Play an active part in determining performance 
objectives/measures of the board 
4.405 4.333 4.1 4.176 
Contribute to the development of internal 
performance measures 
4.304 4.333 4.125 4.147 
Play an active part in determining performance 
objectives/measures for the company 
3.739 3.815 3.6 3.382 
Satisfy themselves that financial information is 
accurate 
4.304 4.481 4.175 4.235 
Be accessible to company managers to advise 
of untoward matters 
4.333 4.629 4.325 4.117 
Provide an independent “check” on corporate 
control 
4.202 4 4.075 3.823 
Ensure robust risk management is in place 4.275 4.518 4.3 3.941 
Play an active part in determining social 
responsibility performance objectives/ 
measures of the company 
4.058 4.185 4.075 3.764 
Play a key role in the setting of senior 
executive compensation 
4.058 4.222 4.1 4.088 
Play an active part in ensuring the company 
meets its social responsibility objectives/ 
measures 
3.289 3.518 3.3 3.411 
Be a spokesperson to support specific 
corporate policies before the public and 
government 
2.710 2.889 2.925 2.676 
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Table 4 - Key responsibilities of independent directors with different experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           (Anchor point: 1 – Strongly disagree to 5 – Strongly agree)  
           *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IDs with more 
than 3-year 
experience 
IDs with less 
than 3-year 
experience 
Mean 
difference 
(P-value) 
Contribute to the development of company strategy 4.035 4.070 -0.035 
(0.845) 
Identify issues that require more of management’s 
attention 
4.070 4.194 -0.124 
(0.464) 
Ensure strategic corporate decisions are reached 
through sound processes 
4.508 4.230 0.279 
(0.044)** 
Scrutinize management performance 4.403 3.911 0.492 
(0.001)*** 
Comment on the attainment of the performance 
objectives for the company 
4.508 4.433 0.075 
(0.572) 
Play an active part in determining performance 
objectives/measures of the board 
4.385 4.097 0.288 
(0.023)** 
Contribute to the development of internal performance 
measures 
4.333 3.964 0.369 
(0.002)*** 
Play an active part in determining performance 
objectives/measures for the company 
3.789 3.575 0.214 
(0.211) 
Satisfy themselves that financial information is 
accurate 
4.421 4.106 0.315 
(0.016)** 
Be accessible to company managers to advise of 
untoward matters 
4.333 4.336 -0.003 
(0.983) 
Provide an independent “check” on corporate control 4.122 4.035 0.087 
(0.582) 
Ensure robust risk management is in place 4.386 4.079 0.306 
(0.028)** 
Play an active part in determining social responsibility 
performance objectives/ measures of the company 
4.123 3.867 0.256 
(0.066)* 
Play a key role in the setting of senior executive 
compensation 
4.246 3.903 0.343 
(0.011)** 
Play an active part in ensuring the company meets its 
social responsibility objectives/ measures 
3.667 3.195 0.471 
(0.004)*** 
Be a spokesperson to support specific corporate 
policies before the public and government 
2.912 2.716 0.196 
(0.292) 
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Table 5 – Actions independent directors have power over 
Influence company strategy 82% 
Communicate with shareholders directly 50% 
Change under-performing executives 43% 
Control executive directors’ compensation 30% 
Change professional advisors 25% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Level of Contribution as an independent director on particular activities 
 Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
To protect shareholder/ investor interest 4.111 4 0.665 
To develop company strategies 4.041 4 0.708 
To provide new ideas/ insights 3.982 4 0.717 
To monitor the quality of published financial reports 3.888 4 0.866 
To ask questions and challenge actions and decisions 3.769 4 0.854 
To monitor performance of the board/ other directors 3.688 
 
4 0.962 
To monitor performance/ remuneration of managers 3.553 4 0.850 
To protect the interest of controlling shareholders 3.018 
 
3.5 0.858 
           (Anchor point: 1 – Strongly disagree to 5 – Strongly agree) 
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Table 7 – Influence of controlling shareholders 
 In total sample 
of responses 
From firms with 
State ownership 
From Private 
firms 
Number of responses from firms with controlling 
shareholders 
162 (95.29%) 92 (56.79%) 70 (43.21%) 
Number of responses from firms with chairperson 
as a representative of controlling shareholders 
129 (75.88%) 82 (63.56%) 47 (36.44%) 
Number of responses from firms with CEO as a 
representative of controlling shareholders 
96 (56.47%) 65 (67.71%) 31 (32.29%) 
Number of responses firms dominantly controlled 
by controlling shareholders 
140 85 (60.72%) 55 (39.28%) 
Mechanism to control the firms by controlling 
shareholders: 
1. By appointing more representatives as 
board members 
2. By appointing the chairperson 
3. By appointing CEO 
4. By appointing independent directors 
 
 
146 (85.88%) 
 
129 (75.88%) 
96 (56.47%) 
72 42.35%) 
Nomination of independent directors: 
1. By controlling shareholder 
2. By minority shareholders with close 
relationship with controlling shareholder 
3. By minority shareholders who has no 
relationship with controlling shareholder 
 
103 (60.59%) 
32 (18.82%)  
 
 
35 (20.59%) 
 
 
Table 8 – Information received by independent directors 
Amount of information 
received 
Too much Sufficient Too little 
0% 83% 17% 
Ability to check validity of 
information 
Yes:  77% No: 23% 
Type of information to be 
received more 
Strategic 
information 
Forecast 
information 
Business 
analysis 
Detailed historic financial 
information 
65.14% 52.54% 44.12% 8.15% 
Type of information to be 
received less 
Strategic 
information 
Forecast 
information 
Business 
analysis 
Detailed historic financial 
information 
4.71% 12.35% 6.47% 78.24% 
 
Table 9 – Sources of information 
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
Published financial reports 4.341 4 0.698 
Formal board meetings documents 4.192 4 0.734 
Informal meetings with board members 3.676 4 0.785 
Meeting with heads of business units 3.665 4 0.842 
Visits to operational areas 3.623 4 0.897 
Strategy-away days 3.565 3.5 0.954 
Participation in company events 3.406 3 0.864 
       (Anchor point: 1 – No importance to 5 – Very high importance) 
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Table 10 – Barriers to independent directors 
 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Lack of information for informed decision-making 4.241 
4.5 0.621 
Lack of detailed guidelines on the duties/ responsibilities of 
independent directors in “Corporate governance rules for listed 
companies” 4.159 
 
 
4 
 
 
0.700 
Lack of knowledge/ understanding of the company 
3.906 
 
4 
 
0.862 
Executive directors holding back information 
3.882 
 
4 
 
0.694 
Lack of involvement in company (for example: only being 
available for board meetings) 3.876 
 
4 
 
0.986 
Personal faults/ lack of ability 
3.812 
 
4 
 
0.973 
Insufficient remuneration to motive/recruit 
3.735 
 
4 
 
0.982 
Lack of adequate training provided by SEC to support 
independent directors to understand their roles in corporate 
governance system  3.624 
 
 
4 
 
 
1.007 
Been in the position for too long/ lack of fresh ideas 
3.618 
 
4 
 
0.949 
Lack of commitment  3.612 
4 0.885 
Too many responsibilities elsewhere 3.576 
4 0.953 
Lack of time 3.341 
3 1.067 
Too many rules/ red tape due to corporate governance reforms 3.076 
3 1.206 
        (Anchor point: 1 – Strongly disagree to 5 – Strongly agree) 
 
 
